3. Alternatives to the NPS

3.1 Summary of the alternatives considered

• amendment of the RMA
• ministerial call in of transmission proposals
• whole-of-government submissions on transmission proposals
• enhancing the status quo
• easements over the entire transmission network
• designations over the entire transmission network.

A table summarising these alternatives is given in Appendix A.

Note that there is currently no accepted alternative to the ICNIRP guidelines as the basis for dealing with electric and magnetic field (EMF) issues associated with the electricity transmission network (Policy 6).

3.2 Evaluation of the alternatives

3.2.1 Amendments to the RMA, ministerial call in and whole-of-government submissions

Amendments could be made to the RMA so that Part 2 explicitly recognises the importance of the transmission network to the country. Upon enactment, such changes would have an immediate effect on decision-making on policy statements, plans, notices of requirement and resource consent applications.

The use of ministerial 'call in' powers (under sections 140 to 150AA of the RMA) would enable nationally significant resource consent or notice of requirement proceedings associated with the transmission network to consider the national interest, as well as local interests and environmental values, and would therefore enhance the likelihood that national interest would be applied more consistently throughout the country.

The preparation of whole-of-government submissions presents another option by which to ensure the national interest is considered during RMA proceedings. This would require all government agencies with an interest in a proposal to coordinate their views and present a single and consistent position on the overall national interest. In doing so, this would avoid local authorities needing to make a determination on the national interest.

Despite the benefits of these options, none presents a real alternative to the policy framework proposed in the NPS. If these non-policy options were implemented, it would still be useful to have a policy framework on the national benefits of electricity transmission. Without such a framework, mechanisms such as the ministerial 'call in' powers would need to be exercised within a vacuum of accepted policy on the benefits of transmission, and would therefore be less effective.

Similarly, without a policy framework, little specific benefit would be provided by any amendment to the RMA on the nature of the national benefits of electricity transmission. Changes to the RMA will only provide a limited direction that such benefits are important, not guidance on the nature of the benefits.

While none of the options are considered to represent alternatives to the proposed provisions on national benefits, the use of both call-in powers and whole-of-government submissions would be appropriate complementary mechanisms.

3.2.2 Enhanced status quo and easements over the network

If achievable, the easement option would enable Transpower to effectively manage nearby land-use activities that could affect the operation of the network. However, this alternative would not enable the management of activities on adjoining properties. Also, the likely transaction costs incurred by Transpower and others in determining the value loss and due compensation, and the negotiation of agreements with individual landowners, would be substantial. These costs would ultimately be passed on to electricity consumers, with further consequences for their decisions on the use of electricity. Finally, the requirement for easements associated with the transmission network was resolved as part of the Electricity Act 1992. It is therefore considered that easements would not provide an appropriate alternative to the NPS policy option.

The enhanced status quo alternative would rely on including the transmission network on plan maps and better enforcement of the New Zealand Electrical Code of Practice 34:2001 (NZECP 34) to minimise the effect of land-use activities on the transmission network. As discussed below, including the transmission network on plan maps should increase awareness of its presence among council resource consent and building consent processing officers and potential purchasers of land. Better enforcement of NZECP 34 would reduce the risk of disruption to the transmission network from some of the land-use activities the policy options seek to address.

In the Reference Group report, better enforcement of NZECP 34 is considered, among other mechanisms, in some detail. The discussion identifies significant limitations in terms of the mechanics of enforcing NZECP 34 and also the scope of the Code. Based on this discussion it appears that significant costs would be incurred in attempting to implement the Code, and also that the effectiveness of this mechanism would be limited.

3.2.3 Designations over the network

A further alternative is for designations that provide for minor works to be created for the entire transmission network. These designations could be achieved in two ways.

1. Transpower, as a requiring authority, could issue notices of requirement to all local authorities traversed by the network.
2. Legislation could be introduced which deems a designation to exist over the network, and which defines those works covered by that designation.

The first option (notices of requirement) could only be achieved at significant cost to Transpower, because of the requirement for Transpower to 'take an interest' and pay compensation for loss of land value to landowners affected by the designation. The Reference Group report notes that many thousands of landowners would be affected by such designations. The transaction costs of determining lost value, negotiating with each landowner and paying the compensation due would be substantial, and would probably be disproportionate to the benefit obtained (ie, the avoided costs of going through current RMA procedures).

In addition, Transpower would face the cost of obtaining the designation. It is likely that Transpower would need to submit notices of requirement in all districts, and each notice of requirement would need to be accompanied by a specific assessment of environmental effects.

Post-notification, some cost savings may be able to be obtained through joint hearings, or ministerial call in, that incorporate notices of requirement across multiple local authorities. However, the hearing costs would still be very significant. It is also difficult to see how the matters of detail likely to be raised during such a process could be addressed at anything above a regional level. Consequently, the use of joint hearings would only have a limited effect in terms of being able to reduce the costs of the process to Transpower.

Given the standard of information required, consultation expectations and the controversy that is likely to be associated with each notice of requirement, the cost of obtaining each notice of requirement could be in the vicinity of $500,000, and possibly more. Furthermore, achieving designations across the country could take in the vicinity of 10 to 15 years. This timeframe is based on the expectation that it would involve multiple projects that could not be resourced concurrently.

Such a timeframe would cause significant delays for Transpower in relation to their ongoing maintenance needs and planned network upgrade. Plus there would be no guarantee that all notices of requirement would be confirmed, or that for those that are confirmed the conditions imposed on each would be consistent. Consequently, in addition to a significant cost, it is unlikely that this approach would be effective in achieving the consistency of outcome implicitly sought in the objective.

The second option (legislation that deems designations to exist over the network) was considered by the Reference Group, which concluded that it was not appropriate. The reasons for this finding were, among other things, the:

• potential cost of the requirement to take an interest in the designated land
• loss of participation rights.

Although the transaction cost of achieving the designation would be greatly reduced, the cost of compensating for the interest taken in land alongside the network and the significant loss of participation rights mean that such an approach would not be appropriate. Also, the loss of participation rights could have significant follow-on implications in relation to the willingness of landowners to co-operate with Transpower, government and local authorities on other matters.

3.2.4 Non-statutory guidance

In addition to the options considered above, non-statutory guidance represents an alternative, not just to individual provisions within the NPS but also to the NPS itself. Such guidance could be provided by the Ministry in relation to:

• the national benefits of the transmission network and how these should be considered as part of RMA-based decision-making
• model policy statement and plan provisions
• appropriate methods for mitigating the adverse effects of the transmission network, including model consent conditions.

Guidance could be provided by way of publications and a series of workshops for practitioners, held across the country. The guidance material could be developed in consultation not only with Transpower, but also with local government and landowner representatives.

The benefit of this approach would be to increase awareness of the issues associated with the transmission network and of best practice in relation to managing these issues. However, ultimately the translation of this guidance into policy and plan provisions, and its recognition as part of consent conditions, would be voluntary. It is likely that the uptake of the guidance would be influenced by the level of sensitivity of the local community to the transmission network. That is, in those areas where the local community has become particularly sensitised to the transmission network, the political will to implement the guidance material may be less than in other locations. It is anticipated that these areas are also likely to be those where the need for ongoing maintenance and upgrade of the network is of higher priority.

For this reason, the effectiveness of the guidance could not be assured. Given the national importance of the network, it is therefore concluded that a guidance approach would not represent a full alternative to the NPS; although it may have some value as a complementary measure and would usefully be included as part of any promotional/education programme undertaken after the NPS is finalised.

3.3 Conclusions

It is the overall conclusion of this evaluation that none of the options represent full alternatives to the NPS or its specific provisions. The key reasons for this conclusion are that none of the options would provide an appropriate policy framework to guide RMA-based decisions relevant to the network. Furthermore, the options involving easement or designations would present significant costs and delays, which would ultimately be passed on to electricity consumers.

However, although it is considered that the options do not provide appropriate alternatives to the NPS or its provisions, some would be appropriate complementary measures. In particular the procedural options (call in and whole-of-government submissions) would add value to the policy framework provided by the NPS.